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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CLINTON PERANK, 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
l Case No. 860196 
> Priority 2 
1 (Supreme Court No. 860243) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Criminal Proceedings in Lower Court 
Appellant Clinton Perank was charged with burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Secton 76-6-202, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended (R. 1). 
Pursuant to a plea of guilty, Perank was convicted as charged 
in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne Coun-
ty, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard C. Davidson presiding 
(R. 10). Perank was sentenced on October 27, 1983, to serve an 
indeterminate term of not more than five years in the Utah State 
Prison. However, execution of the prison sentence was suspended 
and he was placed on probation for eighteen (18) months, the 
terms of which included, inter alia, payment of a $750.00 fine 
and restitution, and a six-month jail sentence (execution of 
which was suspended) (R. 11). 
On December 5, 1983, Perank's probation was modified based 
upon admitted violations of his probation agreement (R. 19). 
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On January 28, 1985, Perank1s probation officer filed an af-
fidavit alleging additional violations of probation (R. 42). 
Perank failed to appear for a scheduled March 18, 1985, hearing 
on probation revocation and a bench warrant was issued (R. 43). 
A hearing was finally held on May 28, 1985, and the court found 
Perank had violated the terms of his probation (R. 47). Sentenc-
ing was continued pending disposition of certain other criminal 
charges against him (R. 47, 50-51). 
On January 31, 1986, yet another probation violation report 
was filed against Perank based upon a series of new violations 
including fresh burglary and theft charges (R. 51-53). The mat-
ter was heard on April 21, 1986. Perank, for the first time 
during any criminal proceedings in this case, asserted that the 
court lacked jurisdiction over him because he is an Indian, and 
the original burglary offense allegedly took place in Indian 
country (R. 82). The lower court rejected these claims, and 
thereafter revoked Perankfs probation and executed the prison 
sentence (R. 63). 
On or about October 21, 1986, the lower court, based upon 
stipulation of counsel, stayed its order revoking Perankfs proba-
tion (see Supplemental Record on Appeal). 
B. Course of Proceedings Involving Appellantfs Indian Country 
and Indian Status Claims 
As noted above, Perankfs defense at his final probation revo-
cation hearing was that the court lacked jurisdiction because: 
(1) the original burglary occurred in Indian country; and (2) he 
is an Indian. 
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Support for his claim that he is an Indian is essentially 
based on Affidavits from his father and mother he presented at 
the probation revocation hearing, and Article II of the Ute 
Indian Tribal Constitution. They allege that Perankfs father is 
a full-blooded Indian and an enrolled member of the Ute Tribe, 
that his mother has some Indian blood, and that Perank was born 
in Roosevelt, Utah, while the family was residing on the Indian 
reservation (R. 69-72). 
Perank also asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction be-
cause the original crime took place in Indian country. Indian 
country is defined at 18 U.S.C. 1151 to include: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reser-
vation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and including rights-of-way running through 
the reservation, . . . 
Perank rests his position on the en banc decision of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 596 (Dec. 
1, 1986) (App. Br. pp. 4-5). The en banc court, with two judges 
dissenting, held that the original Uintah reservation still ex-
ists as originally established, undiminished (except for two 
relatively small areas). The burglary that led to Perankfs con-
viction occurred in Myton, Utah, which is located within the ex-
terior boundaries of the original Uintah reservation as defined 
by the en banc majority. 
However, the state district court concluded that the crime 
was not committed in Indian country. In reaching this result, 
that court necessarily agreed with the Statefs contention (R, 86-
87) that the reservation is limited to the trust lands.1/ The 
trust lands are those lands held in trust by the United States 
for the exclusive use and occupation of the Ute Indian Tribe, and 
no one disputes that the trust lands occupy reservation status 
and constitute Indian country within the purview of 18 U.S.C. 
1151. Myton—where the burglary occurred—is situated on non-
trust land.£/ 
While this matter was before the lower court on Perank's 
probation violation, the Ute Indian case was pending before the 
United States Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari filed by the State of Utah, Duchesne and Uintah Counties, 
and Roosevelt and Duchesne Cities. Subsequent to Perank's appeal 
and the filing of his brief before the Utah Supreme Court, the 
parties stipulated that Respondent's brief could await the ruling 
1. The terms "Indian country" and "Indian reservation" are 
often used interchangeably, and refer to the area—regardless of 
land ownership—within the exterior boundaries of an Indian 
reservation. The term "trust lands" refers to lands held in 
trust by the United States for the exclusive use and occupation 
of Indians or Indian tribes. See generally F. Cohen, Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law, pp. 34-44 (1982 ed.). Thus, Indian country 
or an Indian reservation, with attendant jurisdictional ramifica-
tions, can, depending on the situation, include non-Indian land 
located within the exterior boundaries of a reservation. 
2. See map, Ex. I-1B, which illustrates the boundary claims 
of the parties as well as general land ownership in the area. 
The foregoing citation is to the record in Ute Indian Tribe v. 
State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072 (U.S.D.C. Utah 1981). When this 
matter was before the trial court for the probation revocation 
hearing, counsel for the parties stipulated that for purposes of 
determining whether the crime occurred on the reservation (within 
Indian country), the record before the federal court in the Ute 
Indian Tribe case could be considered. Consequently all record 
citations in our brief involving this issue will be to that 
record. In this regard, JX refers to Joint Exhibits; LD refers 
to the Joint Compendium of Legislative Documents; and the Trial 
Court Transcript is referred to as Tr. 
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of the United States Supreme Court in the Ute Indian case. The 
United States Supreme Court denied the writ on December 1, 1986 
(107 S.Ct. 596). We concede that had the United States Supreme 
Court accepted the Ute Indian case and issued a decision on the 
merits, that would have been a dispositive judicial resolution of 
the boundary question. However, since the Supreme Court refused 
to grant certiorari, there has been no definitive judicial 
resolution of the boundary question by the highest federal court. 
A denial of certiorari is not a decision on the merits: 
Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a 
petition for a writ of certiorari means is that 
fewer than four members of the Court thought it 
should be granted, this Court has rigorously in-
sisted that such a denial carries with it no im-
plication whatever regarding the Courtfs views on 
the merits of a case which it has declined to re-
view. The Court has said this again and again: 
again and again the admonition has to be repeated. 
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1949), and 
Stern, Gressman & Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice, Section 5.7, 
pp. 269-70 (6th ed. 1986). 
This Court has a right to its own view on reservation 
status.1/ Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme 
Court in both DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 
430-31 (1975), and Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984), 
because the Supreme Court of South Dakota reached a different 
result than did the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on whether or 
not a reservation had been disestablished. The Utah Supreme 
3. Other state courts have found themselves in a similar 
situation. See, e.g., State v. Janis, 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 
1982), and Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 1977). 
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Court has previously had occasion to address matters involving 
the Ute Indian reservation. Shortly after Congress opened the 
reservation to settlement by non-Indians in 1905, the Utah 
Supreme Court in both Sovards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 
1112 (1910), and Whiterocks Irrigation Co, v. Mooseman, 45 Utah 
79, 141 P. 459 (1914), recognized that the unallotted land had 
been restored to the public domain. 
In the 1970fs, the question of the status of the Ute reserva-
tion was specifically considered by the Utah Supreme Court. The 
Court concluded that the original Uintah reservation ceased to 
exist, but did so without detailed discussion. Brough v. Appawo-
ra, 553 P.2d 934 (Utah 1976), vacated, Mem. 431 U.S. 901 (1977). 
Pursuant to a petition for a writ of certiorari, the United 
States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for fur-
ther consideration in light of Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 43 0 
U.S. 584 (1977). However, when Brough was remanded to the trial 
court by the Utah Supreme Court, it was then removed to the 
federal district court (District Judge Willis W. Ritter had pre-
viously restrained the State from proceeding in reliance on 
Brough). The case was ultimately dismissed without any state 
court having considered the issue in light of Rosebud. 
The United States, as amicus curiae before the United States 
Supreme Court opposed certiorari in Ute Indian Tribe, but con-
ceded in its discussion of Brough that, despite the consideration 
of the boundary question by lower federal courts, the Utah courts 
may again be called upon to consider the boundary issue: 
The Utah Supreme Court did render a decision almost 
a decade ago that seemed to assume that these lands 
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were no longer part of the Reservation. Brough v. 
Appawora, 553 P.2d 934 (1976). But this Court, at 
the urging of the United States, vacated that deci-
sion and remanded for further consideration in 
light of Rosebud (431 U.S. 901 (1977)), and, as 
petitioners concede (Pet. 19 n.35), the diminish-
ment issue was not resolved on remand. If the Utah 
Supreme Court nevertheless should adhere to its 
prior view in some future case, notwithstanding the 
intervening decision in Solem and the exhaustive 
consideration of the issue by the courts below, 
there will be time enough for this Court to grant 
review.!/ 
C. Relevant Facts Concerning the Uintah Reservation 
The original Uintah reservation, which had been created in 
the 1860's5/, consisted of more than two million acres, most of 
which is located in Duchesne County.£/ Pursuant to the Act of 
May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263), as amended, a Presidential 
Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119), provided that all 
the unallotted and unreserved lands of the original Uintah 
reservation were restored to the public domain and opened for 
public settlement under the homestead and townsite laws.2/ The 
4. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
14-15 in State of Utah v. Ute Indian Tribe, No. 85-1821 
(November 1986). 
5. The creation of the Uintah reservation and its early his-
tory are reviewed in some detail in the United States District 
Court opinion in Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. 1072, 1092-1100. 
6. See Executive Order of Oct. 3, 1861 (I Kappler 900); Act 
of May 5, 1864 (13 Stat. 63); and [1879] Commissioner of Indian 
Aff. Rept., at 331 (JX 3). The western-most part of the original 
reservation is located in Wasatch County and the eastern-most 
part is located in Uintah County. 
7. See, e.g., Uintah and White River Bands of Ute Indians v. 
United States, 139 Ct.Cl. 1, 22 (1957); Hanson v. United States, 
153 F.2d 162, 162-63 (10th Cir. 1946); and Sowards v. Meagher, 
supra, at 1116. 
following exceptions were made from this Proclamation: (1) the 
Secretary of the Interior set aside approximately 250,000 acres 
as a grazing reserve for the Ute Indians pursuant to the Joint 
Resolution of June 19, 1902 (32 Stat. 744)§/; (2) more than one 
million acres were added to the Uinta National Forest (34 Stat. 
3116); and (3) some 56,000 acres were reserved for reservoir 
sites for Indians and general agricultural development under the 
Presidential Proclamation of August 3, 1905 (34 Stat. 3141, as 
modified, 34 Stat. 3143).2/ Of the balance, approximately 99,000 
acres were allotted to individual Indians and another 7,000 
acres—the "Gilsonite Strip"—had already been restored to the 
public domain in 1888 (25 Stat. 157). 
After 1905 and for the next forty years, the tribal reserves, 
together with the allotted lands in the original Uncompahgrel0/ 
8. More than 20,000 acres were also set aside by the Depart-
ment of the Interior as a tribal timber reserve for the Ute 
Indians. See, e.g., Memorandum of Chief Supervisor of Forests, 
dated March 20, 1922, at 1 (JX 401). See also 1932 Annual Report 
of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 427). 
9. In the Act of April 4, 1910 (36 Stat. 269, 285), Congress 
provided compensation and thereby extinguished all of the Ute 
Indians1 right, title and interest to these reclamation lands. 
The Utes were also ultimately compensated for the lands opened to 
settlement and the National Forest withdrawals. See e.g., Uintah 
and White River Bands of Ute Indians, supra, at 6-7, 11. 
10. The allotted lands consisted only of approximately 12,500 
acres. E.g., [1899] Commissioner of Indian Aff. Rept. at 543 (JX 
117); and [1911] Commissioner of Indian Aff. Rept. at 92 (JX 
353). The Uncompahgre reservation—which was created as a sepa-
rate reservation from the Uintah reservation—was also the sub-
ject of the Ute Indian Tribe litigation (but is not involved 
here). The Ute Indian Tribe today refers to the entire reserva-
tion as the Uintah and Ouray reservation. 
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and Uintah reservations!!/, were treated as the Ute Indians1 ex-
isting reservation. On August 25, 1945, however, a 217,000 acre 
tract of opened and undisposed-of land located within what had 
been part of the original Uintah reservation was, by Proclamation 
of the Secretary of the Interior (10 Fed. Reg. 12409), restored 
to tribal ownership and Hadded to and made a part of the existing 
reservation11 pursuant to Sections 3 and 7 of the 1934 Indian 
Reorganization Act (48 Stat. 984). Later, the Act of March 11, 
1948 (62 Stat. 72), added an additional 500,000 acres—the so-
called Hill Creek Extension—to the Ute Indians1 reservation. 
There is no dispute that the tribal reserves together with 
the remaining allotments—some 360,000 acres—are "Indian coun-
try" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1151(a) and (c). Nor does 
anyone question that the surplus lands restored to tribal owner-
ship and reservation status in 1945 and 1948 (the Hill Creek 
Extension)—which total more than 700,000 acres—are also Indian 
country. This entire area, comprising more than one million 
acres,11/ had been considered the extent of the Tribe's existing 
11. See e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth, J., 
dissenting); and S. Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 
(1919) (letter of the Secretary of Interior). 
12. Approximately half of the trust lands lie within the 
boundaries of the original Uintah reservation, while the other 
half lies within the original Uncompahgre reservation. The Ute 
Tribe contested that only these lands were originally treated as 
its reservation. As the dissent in Ute Indian Tribe concluded, 
however, the record establishes otherwise (see 773 F.2d 1105), a 
point the en banc majority did not dispute. See also S. Doc. No-
78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the Sec. of 
Interior); and 1957 Ute Tribe Ten-Year Development Program, at 
66-68 (JX 465). 
reservation until recent years (see, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773 
F.2d at 1105 (Seth, J., dissenting)).11/ 
As to the remaining portions of the original reservation, 
where Congress ended Indian ownership long ago, the area has his-
torically been the primary concern of the State and local govern-
ments. The population and land use of the disputed area are more 
than 90 percent non-Indian, and nearly all the enrolled members 
of the Tribe live elsewhere, Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105 
(Seth, J., dissenting). Within the disputed area (the non-trust 
lands) there are a substantial number of incorporated towns and 
cities (such as Roosevelt and Duchesne), and in recent years 
there has been significant natural resource, business and recre-
ational development. 
While this case presents a question of criminal jurisdiction, 
the implications of the decision transcend the narrow issue pre-
sented here. Approximately 18,000 non-Indian inhabitants**/ of 
the Uinta Basin area face the prospect of being suddenly thrust 
into the status of residents of an Indian reservation, where 
13. The tribal governmental unit is also located on the un-
disputed trust lands. The present governing body of the Ute 
Indian Tribe is a six member Tribal Business Committee. Two rep-
resentatives of each of the three Ute Bands, the White River, the 
Uintah and the Uncompahgre, are elected to this Committee. In 
the 1985 tribal election, a total of 430 votes were cast for all 
candidates. Uintah Basin Standard, p. 20, April 17, 1985. 
14. The combined population of Duchesne and Uintah Counties 
is currently estimated to be 39,000; approximately 18,000 non-
Indians live within the historic reservation boundaries. On the 
other hand, the present number of enrolled members of the Tribe 
is estimated to be 1,500. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105; 
and Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Research Report, Univ. of Utah, Vol. 
45, No. 1, p. 8, Table 5, July 1, 1984 (1985). 
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their officials would have only limited jurisdiction and where 
they would have no elective voice in the governance of their af-
fairs and property by the Ute Tribe. For its part, the Tribe has 
already enacted a comprehensive Law and Order Code which, by its 
terms, is applicable to Indians and non-Indians alike throughout 
both historic reservation areas. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 
1101. Although the Tribe would not have the criminal jurisdic-
tion they claimed over non-Indians (see Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the same cannot be said with 
respect to civil jurisdiction.!^/ The Tribe1s Code also has a 
comprehensive Exclusion and Removal section, which purports to be 
applicable to both Indians and non-Indians throughout the two 
original reservations in certain situations. 
D. Federal Court Litigation 
Since Perank relies exclusively on the en banc decision in 
Ute Indian Tribe to support his argument that the burglary took 
place in Indian country, we summarize that litigation. Because 
15. National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 105 S.Ct. 7 
(1985). In 1981, the Supreme Court noted that Indian tribes 
••retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-
Indian fee lands. . . .H Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 
565 (1981) (emphasis added). The lower courts, construing tribal 
authority on reservation fee lands, have stated that such au-
thority includes the power of taxation as well as some land use 
and related regulation. See, e.g., Snow v. Quinault Indian 
Tribe, 709 F.2d 1319 (9th~clr. 1983), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1214 
(1984); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert, de-
nied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian 
Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982); Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982); and Colville Confederated Tribes v. 
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1092 
(1981). 
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discussion of the legal principles in that litigation involved 
both the Uintah and Uncompahgre reservations, we note rulings as 
to both reservations—even though only the Uintah reservation is 
involved here. With respect to the boundaries of the Uintah 
reservation, each of the three federal court decisions reached a 
different result. 
In 1975, after enacting its Law and Order Code, the Ute 
Indian Tribe sued Duchesne County and the Cities of Roosevelt and 
Duchesne, claiming that the original Uintah and Uncompahgre 
reservations—the combined area of which exceeds four million 
acres—presently exist to the full extent of their historic 
boundaries. The State of Utah subsequently intervened as a party 
defendant in 1976, and Uintah County was joined as a defendant in 
1979. The district court held that the original Uncompahgre 
reservation had been disestablished by the Act of June 7, 1897 
(30 Stat. 62, 87). Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. 1110. The 
court further held that the original Uintah reservation had been 
diminished through: (1) the withdrawal of the so-called "Gil-
sonite Strip" pursuant to the Act of May 24, 1888 (25 Stat. 157); 
(2) the withdrawal of approximately one million acres for inclu-
sion in the Uinta National Forest pursuant to the Act of March 3, 
1905 (33 Stat. 1048, 1070); and (3) the withdrawal of approxi-
mately 56,000 acres of land for the Strawberry Reclamation Pro-
ject by the Act of April 4, 1910 (36 Stat. 269, 285). Ute Indian 
Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1153-54. The court also recognized, as had 
the parties, that the Tribefs reservation had been enlarged to 
include the 500,000 acre tract known as the "Hill Creek Exten-
sion" under the Act of March 11, 1948 (62 Stat. 72). Ute Indian 
Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1109. 
On appeal, a panel of the Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed 
the lower court's decisions that: (1) the original Uncompahgre 
reservation had been disestablished; (2) the original Uintah 
reservation had been diminished by the withdrawal of the MGil-
sonite Strip" and the land for the Strawberry River Irrigation 
Project; and (3) the Tribe's reservation was later expanded by 
the Hill Creek Extension. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1304-15. 
By a divided vote, the panel also affirmed the district court's 
holding that the original Uintah reservation had been diminished 
by the National Forest withdrawal. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 
1313-14. Reversing the lower courtfs decision, the panel held 
that reservation status had ended with respect to lands within 
the original Uintah reservation opened for settlement pursuant to 
the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended (32 Stat. 245, 263), and that 
the present-day reservation consisted of only the "trust lands". 
Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1313. 
The Tribe petitioned for rehearing solely in regard to the 
status of the former Uintah reservation lands opened pursuant to 
the 1902 Act. After the Supreme Court's decision in Solem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), the court of appeals granted 
rehearing en banc. The Tribe then filed an amended petition to 
include the status of the original Uncompahgre reservation and 
the National Forest withdrawal from the original Uintah 
reservation. 
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The en banc court, with two judges dissenting, disagreed with 
the decision of the panel and, invoking Solem, held that both the 
original Uncompahgre and Uintah reservations still exist un-
diminished (except for the 1888 Gilsonite Strip and 1910 Straw-
berry Reclamation Project withdrawals). Ute Indian Tribe, 773 
F.2d 1087. The State and local governmental entities then peti-
tioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, 
which petition was denied on December 1, 1986 (107 S.Ct. 596). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Perank claims a lack of state district court jurisdiction in 
this matter because he is an Indian and because the crime was 
committed within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation 
(Indian country). To support his argument that the offense took 
place in Indian country, Perank simply relies on the decision of 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. State 
of Utah, et al., 773 F.2d 1087 (cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 596). 
The en banc majority in Ute Indian Tribe held that the boundaries 
of the Uintah reservation, which comprise the entire drainage 
basin of the Duchesne River, remain intact. This area encom-
passes a number of non-Indian communities such as Duchesne, 
Roosevelt and Myton, Utah. 
It is Respondents position that reservation status ended 
with respect to lands within the original Uintah reservation 
opened for settlement pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 
Stat. 245, 263), as amended, and that the present-day reservation 
consists only of the "trust lands." Thus, there is no dispute 
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that the trust lands are Indian country. But the criminal of-
fense involved here occurred off trust lands in Myton, Utah, 
Reduced to its essentials, this appeal involves whether the non-
trust-lands portion of the historic Uintah reservation is within 
Indian country. 
The en banc majority failed to apply the correct analytical 
test consistent with relevant United States Supreme Court prece-
dents. In this regard, the en banc majority incorrectly con-
cluded that the Supreme Court1s decision in Solem established new 
standards for evaluating disestablishment cases, but (as is shown 
in Point I.A., infra) this is not so. By failing to apply the 
correct test, the en banc majority did not give proper consider-
ation to language in the acts of Congress opening the reservation 
to settlement and restoring surplus lands to the public domain. 
Such language constitutes a clear expression of congressional 
intent to disestablish. This legislation, as well as the legis-
lative history and circumstances surrounding the opening of the 
Uintah reservation from 1902 to 1905, clearly shows a congres-
sional intent to restore the surplus lands of the reservation to 
the public domain, and thus to disestablish the reservation 
(Point I.B.2, infra). 
The en banc majority also ignored other relevant factors that 
must be considered under the Supreme Court's decisions. The 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that a de facto, if not a de jure, 
disestablishment may have occurred. See, e.g., Rosebud, 430 U.S. 
at 604-05, and Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. By focusing all of its 
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attention on Solem and treating it as setting forth new princi-
ples, the en banc majority blinded itself to the teachings of the 
Supreme Court*s earlier decisions. In addition to the statutory 
language, the surrounding circumstances and legislative history 
are to be examined in interpreting surplus land enactments. 
Subsequent administrative and congressional treatment are also 
relevant factors. Who actually moved onto the opened reservation 
land is likewise relevant to deciding whether a surplus land act 
diminished a reservation and whether the area has lost its Indian 
character. The record here demonstrates that the en banc majori-
ty did not consider these factors in a manner consistent with 
relevant principles (Point I.B.3, infra). 
The administrative, congressional and judicial treatment of 
the disputed area subsequent to the 1905 opening confirms the 
fact that the Uintah reservation was disestablished. The subse-
quent treatment of the area clearly demonstrates that federal, 
State and local governments treated the disputed area as not 
being part of the Uintah reservation. In addition, the de-
mographic history of the disputed area strongly supports dises-
tablishment. The land ownership and population in the disputed 
area is overwhelmingly non-Indian, with the great majority of 
tribal members residing on Indian-owned trust lands. To place 
the disputed area in Indian country status would upset the long-
held justifiable expectations of the non-Indian population who 
moved into this area and settled, and it would not significantly 
enhance tribal sovereignty. Further, it would greatly impair 
State and local governmental functions and authority in the Uinta 
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Basin. And finally, given the state of the record, it cannot be 
said that Perank's status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections 
1152 and 1153 was not established below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OFFENSE WAS NOT COMMITTED WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY 
AND THE STATE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
Perank claims his crime was committed within Indian country 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151, and that—coupled with the allega-
tion that he is an Indian—deprived the state district court of 
jurisdiction. The following section of this brief will demon-
strate that the crime did not take place within Indian country 
because the original Uintah reservation has been disestablished 
and today consists only of "trust lands," and Perank's offense 
was committed outside those trust lands. We first examine the 
principles established by the United States Supreme Court for 
determining whether a reservation has been disestablished. This 
is followed by an examination of the legislation and facts and 
circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation 
which show that it has been disestablished. 
A* General Principles Governing Disestablishment 
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263), 
as amended, a Presidential Proclamation issued on July 14, 1905 
(34 Stat. 3119), providing that all the unallotted and unreserved 
lands of the original Uintah reservation were restored to the 
public domain and opened for public settlement under the home-
stead and townsite laws. It is settled law that some surplus 
land acts diminished reservations, see, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
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v. Knelp, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), and DeCoteau v. District County 
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and other surplus land acts did not, 
see, e.g,, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), and Seymour v. 
Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). Solem, 465 U.S. at 468-69. 
As explained in Solem, the Supreme Court has established a "fair-
ly clean analytical structure" for distinguishing those surplus 
land acts that of their own force effected an immediate diminish-
ment of the reservation from those acts that simply permitted 
non-Indians to purchase land within an existing reservation and 
left to another day the actual redrawing of its boundaries (id. 
at 470). Because Appellant does no more than submit the decision 
of the en banc majority to support his contention that the crime 
took place in Indian country, we must examine that decision in 
light of controlling Supreme Court precedents. 
1. The en banc majorityfs decision in Ute Indian Tribe that 
the historic reservations were not disestablished ultimately 
rests on the proposition that restoration to public domain lan-
guage is not the same as a congressional state of mind to dises-
tablish and does not reliably establish the clear and unequivocal 
evidence of Congress1 intent to change boundaries. In so hold-
ing, the majority acknowledged that this had not been the law 
prior to Solem and, indeed, all of the judges who had considered 
this case before Solem agreed that such language was synonymous 
with disestablishment. See Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1303 
(panel opinion); id. at 1316 (Doyle, J., dissenting); and 521 
F.Supp. at 1122 (district court opinion). To the en banc major-
ity, however, Solem altered this long-standing principle of 
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interpretation and marked a new direction in the Supreme Court's 
view of turn-of-the-century legislation concerning Indian reser-
vations. Thus, the en banc majority concluded that "[u]nder the 
Solem standards neither the Uncompahgre Reservation nor the 
Uintah Reservation has been disestablished or diminished by any 
of the congressional enactments in question". Ute Indian Tribe, 
773 F.2d at 1090-91. 
The majority's reading of Solem is not correct. Solem did 
not establish new "standards" and it did not alter the principles 
announced in Seymour, Mattz, DeCoteau and Rosebud# which the 
Court in Solem described as having "established a fairly clean 
analytical structure for distinguishing those surplus land acts 
that diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered 
non-Indians the opportunity to purchase lands within established 
reservation boundaries." 465 U.S. at 470. Although the Court 
has added several relevant factors to the traditional indicia of 
legislative intent, including how Congress and the Department of 
the Interior have treated the area in later years and whether the 
area has "lost its Indian character" because it is "predominately 
populated by non-Indians" (Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 & n.12), the 
Court has not departed from the governing principle "that con-
gressional intent will control" (Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586, and 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71). 
In determining whether an Indian reservation exists, one must 
therefore first examine the face of the relevant legislation. 
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587. In each of the disestablishment cases 
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decided before Solem, the Court expressly acknowledged that res-
toration to public domain constitutes firm and unequivocal lan-
guage of disestablishment. See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589 & n.5; 
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27, 446; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504, n.22; 
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354-55; and United States v. Pelican, 232 
U.S. 442, 445-46 (1914). In the clearest possible terms, the 
Court stated that restoration to the public domain meant 
••stripped of reservation status." DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446. 
The decisions in Rosebud and Decoteau fairly reflect the view 
of the Court on this point. Although in both cases the Court was 
divided on the question whether the particular area involved had 
retained reservation status, the Court was unanimous that such 
restoration language amounted to a unequivocal expression of an 
intent to disestablish. See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589, n.5; id. 
at 618 (Marshall, J.f dissenting); DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27, 
446; id. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice 
Marshall—who wrote the Court*s opinion in Solem—observed in his 
dissenting opinion in Rosebud that an 1889 surplus land act ex-
pressly restoring lands to the public domain (25 Stat. 896, sec. 
21) was wyet another example" of M•clear language of express ter-
mination. . • ••••' Id., 430 U.S. at 618. 
Solem did not reject or alter this firmly-established rule of 
interpretation. The crucial provision interpreted in Solem did 
not provide for the restoration of the surplus lands to the 
public domain, nor was any such language contained in the opera-
tive portions of the Solem legislation. Instead, a reference to 
••public domain11 appeared in a subsequent section providing that 
tribal members could harvest timber on certain portions of the 
opened lands, "only as long as the land remained part of the 
public domain." Sec. 9, 35 Stat. 464. The Court acknowledged 
that even this oblique reference was evidence of disestablish-
ment; it found, however, that because the phrase was "isolated," 
it could not be dispositive. Solem, 465 U.S. at 475. 
In justifying its expansive interpretation of Solem, the en 
banc majority also relied upon a footnote in Solem stating that 
there was "considerable doubt as to what Congress meant in 
using..." public domain terminology in the Solem legislation 
since the affected lands "could be conceived of as being in the 
•public domain1 inasmuch as they were available for settlement" 
(id., 465 U.S. at 475, n.17). It is evident, however, that the 
Court did not intend this statement in Solem to overrule its 
prior decisions and to discount the significance of public domain 
language in every other instance. The Court had already indi-
cated that such language supported the disestablishment claim 
and, in any event, the Court would hardly have confined its com-
ments to one sentence in a footnote had it intended such a dras-
tic departure from the views, expressed by both the majority and 
dissenting Justices in prior cases, regarding the significance of 
such restoration language. 
The en banc majorityfs decision to the contrary also over-
looks the Solem Court1s later observation, in the context of 
subsequent jurisdictional history, that: 
Unentered lands were considered a part of the 
reservation. They were available for allotment to 
tribal members, they were leased for the benefit of 
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the tribe, and they were specifically defined as 
different from land in public domain. 
Id. at 480, n.25 (emphasis added), quoting F. Hoxie, Jurisdiction 
on the Cheyenne River Reservation: An Analysis of the Causes and 
Consequences of the Act of May 29, 1908, at 87 (undated). The 
reference to public domain in the quoted passage can only be 
understood on the basis that public domain and reservation status 
are mutually exclusive.!§/ In short, Solem does not signal the 
Supreme Court's abandonment of its previous interpretations of 
restoration to public domain language. Such language continues 
to be the clearest expression of disestablishment. 
2. Although Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v. 
Klamath Indian Tribe, 105 S.Ct. 3420 (1985),11/ required that the 
various acts involved here—which contain identical operative 
language—should be interpreted to have the same effect, the en 
banc majority did not do so and thereby compounded its error. In 
this regard, there was no dispute that the so-called "Gilsonite 
16. This is how the author of the quoted study understood 
it, as he considered public domain status to be crucial in inter-
preting the subsequent jurisdictional treatment of the area in-
volved. See Hoxie, supra, at 87, 88. Thus, he stated that it 
was necessary to determine whether the area in question was "ad-
ministered as part of the public domain. . . .w Id., at 87. 
17. In that case, the issue was whether that Tribe retained 
treaty hunting and fishing rights in an area ceded under a 1901 
cession agreement. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422. In interpreting this 
agreement, the Court initially looked to the construction given a 
prior treaty with the same Tribe containing similar cession lan-
guage. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422, 3428. As the Court there ex-
plained, "[pjresumptively, the similar language used in the 1901 
Cession Agreement should have the same effect." 105 S.Ct. at 
3428. 
- 22 -
Strip"—a 7,000-acre tract located on the edge of the original 
Uintah reservation—was disestablished by the Act of May 24, 1888 
(25 Stat. 157). See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1098 
(Seymour, J., concurring). Compare with district court opinion, 
id., 521 F.Supp. at 1099. See also panel opinion, id., 716 F.2d 
at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting). As Judge Seymour stated, "Con-
gress was completely clear when it terminated Uintah rights in 
the Gilsonite Strip. • . ." Idl^ , 773 F.2d at 1098. Yet the 
operative provisions concerning the Gilsonite Strip used the same 
language as the 1902 (Uintah) Surplus Land Act and expressly re-
stored the area "to the public domain" (Section 1, 25 Stat. 157). 
The en banc majority offered no reason why the restoration lan-
guage contained in the 1902 Uintah Act should be interpreted dif-
ferently, and there is none.liL/ 
3. The decision of the en banc majority is also at odds with 
the decisions of other courts of appeals in disestablishment 
cases. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, in a long line of deci-
sions, have consistently recognized that restoration to public 
domain language is an explicit expression of congressional intent 
to disestablish.il/ Also, decisions of the Tenth Circuit prior 
18. The dissent, on the other hand, relied upon the under-
standing of the parties regarding the effect of the 1888 Act in 
interpreting the 1902 Surplus Land Act, as amended. See Ute 
Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112. 
19. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87, 90 
(8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); United States ex 
rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 
U.S. 425 (1975); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 
F.2d 684, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1973); Beardslee v. United States, 387 
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to Solem had also assumed that such language was synonymous with 
disestablishment,^2/ The significance these decisions accorded 
to restoration to public domain language has a sound historical 
foundation and follows well-established principles regarding 
public lands. See Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1106 (Seth, J., 
dissenting). Long before the acts in question here, it was set-
tled law that when the federal government appropriates or reser-
ves a tract for any purpose, such as an Indian reservation, the 
tract is thereby severed from the public domain—that is, it 
loses its status as public land.H/ In 1889, for instance, the 
19. (Cont'd.) F.2d 280, 285 (8th Cir. 1967); DeMarrias v. 
South Dakota, 319 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1963); Russ v. Wilkins, 
624 F.2d 914, 915, 924 & 927-29 (9th Cir. 1980) (Hoffman, J., 
dissenting), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); United States v. 
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 543 F.2d 676, 696 (9th Cir. 
1976). See also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of South Dako-
ta, 711 F.2d 809, 817 n.8 (8th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 
1042 (1984); United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson, 525 F.2d 
120, 124 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); and 
Putnam v. United States, 248 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1957). 
District court and state court decisions in the disestablish-
ment context have been to the same effect. See, e.g., Russ v. 
Wilkins, 410 F.Supp. 579, 581-82 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other 
grounds, 624 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908 
(1981); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 344 F.Supp. 
777, 778 (D.S.D. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973); 
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F.Supp. 1001, 
1005 (D. Minn. 1971); Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117, 119 
(S.D. 1977); Wood v. Jameson, 130 N.W.2d 95, 99 (S.D. 1964); and 
Lafferty v. State, 125 N.W.2d 171, 174 (S.D. 1963). 
20. See Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir. 
1965); TooTsgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, 98, 104 (10th Cir. 
1950) (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
21. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 
(1839) ; Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston Railroad Co. v. 
United States, 92 U.S. 733, 745 (1875); Hastings and Dakota Rail-
road Co. v. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1889); Bardon v. 
Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 145 U.S. 535, 539 (1892); Spalding 
v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1896); Gibson v. Anderson, 131 
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Supreme Court remarked that: 
The doctrine first announced in Wilcox and 
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, that a tract lawfully ap-
propriated to any purpose becomes thereafter sev-
ered from the mass of public lands . . . has been 
reaffirmed and applied by this court in such a 
great number and variety of cases that it may now 
be regarded as one of the fundamental principles 
underlying the land system of this country. 
Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co., 132 U.S. at 360-61. Contrary 
to the en banc majorityfs view, because the reservation of a 
tract removed it from the public domain,£2/ later restoration of 
the tract to the public domain firmly signified the end of reser-
vation status.23/ 
In sum, the en banc majority's interpretation not only is 
inconsistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the low-
er federal courts in Indian reservation boundary cases, but also 
21. (Contfd.) F. 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1904); United States v. 
Techenor, 12 F. 415, 421 (D. Ore. 1882); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. 
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 13 F. 106, 107 (D. Kan. 
1881); and United States v. Payne, 8 F. 883, 893-94 (W.D. Ark. 
1881). "Public domain" and "public lands" traditionally have 
been regarded as "equivalent" concepts. Barker v. Harvey, 181 
U.S. 481, 490 (1901). 
22. As the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior ex-
plained years later in regard to the original Uintah reservation, 
H[a]lthough the . . . reservation had been created out of the 
public domain, the land comprising it did not occupy the status 
of public domain land while included within the reservation. . . 
." Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 5 (December 7, 1950). 
23. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 
317 (1942). The issue in that case was whether the Sioux Tribe 
was entitled to compensation for certain lands reserved for it by 
executive orders but later "'restored to the public domain1 . . 
." by the President. Id. at 325. In holding that no compensa-
tion was due, the Supreme Court expressly found that the two Ex-
ecutive Orders restoring the lands to the public domain (I Kap-
pler 884-85, 899) "terminated the reservation. . . . " Id. at 
330. 
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is untenable from an historical perspective. At the turn of the 
century, reservation status and public domain status were uni-
formly understood to be mutually exclusive. In construing res-
toration language as it has, the Tenth Circuit has thus attempted 
to ••remake history," which the Supreme Court admonished "cannot" 
be done in order to resurrect a reservation that long ago ceased 
to exist. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449; accord Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 
615. 
B. The Original Uintah Reservation was Disestablished 
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended, 
and Today is Comprised Only of the Trust Lands 
1. Governing Principles Support Disestablishment 
As discussed above, the en banc majority misread 
Solem as changing the Supreme Court's analytical test for deter-
mining reservation disestablishment, and failed to apply the 
proper test when considering the legislation which opened the 
Uintah reservation and restored the unallotted lands to the 
public domain. Restoration to public domain language constitutes 
firm and unequivocal language for disestablishment (DeCoteau, 42 0 
U.S. at 445-46), and demonstrates "an unmistakable baseline pur-
pose of disestablishment11 (Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 592). 
The analysis of the "public domain" language in the 1902 Act 
as amended by subsequent acts is a key part of the analysis to 
determine whether or not the reservation was disestablished. The 
en banc majority did not consider this legislation in a manner 
consistent with relevant precedents, while the en banc dissent 
followed the correct analytical test and reached the correct 
result. Subsection 2 below is an analysis of the legislation 
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opening the reservation. It clearly shows a congressional intent 
to restore the surplus lands to the public domain and dises-
tablish the reservation. 
After disregarding clear language of disestablishment on the 
basis of its misreading of Solem, the en banc majority proceeded 
to ignore other factors that must be considered not only under 
Solem but also under the Supreme Court1s prior decisions. Sum-
marizing these decisions, the Court in Solem stated that when the 
area involved "has long since lost its Indian character, we have 
acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have 
occurred. • . ." 465U.S. at 471. Thus, "who actually moved 
onto opened reservation lands is . . . relevant to deciding 
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. . . .If Id. 
By focusing all its attention on Solem and treating it as 
setting forth new principles, the en banc majority blinded itself 
to the teachings of the Supreme Courtfs earlier decisions. In 
addition to the statutory language, "the •surrounding circum-
stances, f and the legislative history1 are to be examined" in 
interpreting surplus land enactments. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587. 
Accord, e.g., Solem, 465 U.S. at 469-70. The record here demon-
strates that the en banc majority did not consider these factors 
in a manner consistent with the relevant precedents. Subsection 
3 below reviews these other relevant factors. They vividly dem-
onstrate that the decision below will not materially advance the 
interests of tribal sovereignty, and will severely hamper the 
functioning of State and local governments. 
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We now turn to a specific discussion of the legislation, 
legislative history, demographics and other circumstances sur-
rounding the opening of the Uintah reservation. 
2. The Uintah Reservation was Disestablished Pursuant 
to the Act of May 27, 1902y as amended 
a. Creation of the Uintah Reservation 
The Uintah reservation was created by President 
Abraham Lincoln by Executive Order in 1861 and included the en-
tire area within the drainage basin of the Duchesne River, com-
prising approximately 2,039,040 acres (about 3,186 square miles). 
This was later confirmed by Congress in 1864 (13 Stat. 63). The 
various bands of the Ute Tribe were encouraged to move to the 
Uintah reservation so they would finally be settled in a desig-
nated area. See Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1092-1100, for 
a discussion of the creation and early history of the Uintah 
reservation. 
b. Early Efforts to Restore Surplus Reservation 
Lands to the Public Domain—The 1902 Act 
The period around the turn of the century wit-
nessed an active effort by Congress and the President to dises-
tablish large Indian reservations by making individual allotments 
to the Indians and then restoring the remaining lands to the 
public domain for settlement. This, Congress hoped, would 
facilitate the assimilation of Indians into the general society. 
The Uintah reservation was not the only reservation where the 
allotment and surplus program was instigated; it was happening in 
several other reservations in the West at about the same time 
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period. See General Allotment Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 388); DeCo-
teau at 432-33; and Solem at 466-67. 
The Uintah reservation contained vast areas of land in excess 
of the lands needed to satisfy the allotments to the Indians. 
Therefore, Congress enacted the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 
245), which was the Indian Appropriations Act for that year, and 
included a provision restoring any lands not allotted to the 
Indians to the public domain. The relevant portion of the Act 
states: 
That the Secretary of the Interior, with the 
consent thereto of the majority of the adult male 
Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes of 
Ute Indians, be ascertained as soon as practicable 
by an inspector, shall cause to be allotted to each 
head of a family eighty acres of agricultural land 
which can be irrigated and forty acres of such land 
to each other member of said tribes, said allot-
ments to be made prior to October first, nineteen 
hundred and three, on which date all the unallotted 
lands within said reservation shall be restored to 
the public domain: I I • (Emphasis added)• 
Thus, the original 1902 Act authorizing the opening of the reser-
vation contained "public domain1' language which is language "pre-
cisely suited" to disestablishment. DeCoteau, supra, at 445-446. 
Again, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), the 
Supreme Court held that language restoring surplus reservation 
land to the public domain (even though the original act was amen-
ded to provide for a different method of opening) demonstrated 
••an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment." Id. at 
592. See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
An important observation is that, in 1902, Congress believed 
the consent of the Indians had to be obtained before their lands 
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could be allotted and the surplus restored to the public domain 
and thus opened to private settlement and entry under the public 
land laws. Efforts to obtain the consent of the Indians to al-
lotment were unsuccessful within the time limits set forth in the 
1902 Act and Congress was forced to take further action with 
regard to opening the Uintah reservation. However, this task was 
made easier by the Supreme Court's decision in Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), which held that Congress had ex-
clusive and plenary power to deal with reservation lands, without 
the necessity of obtaining the approval or consent of the 
Indians. 
c. Action After the 1902 Act 
Reacting to the latitude confirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Lone Wolf, supra, Congress promptly enacted the Act of 
March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 982), which directed that the Uintah 
reservation should be allotted and the surplus lands opened for 
settlement and entry under the public land laws.2^/ in 1904 Con-
gress again extended the time for the opening to March 10, 1905, 
so that surveying could be completed and allotments made (33 
Stat. 207). 
In the meantime, on April 27, 1903, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs prepared instructions for United States Indian 
Inspector James McLaughlin regarding the opening of the Uintah 
24. It is worthy of note that it took Congress fewer than 
sixty days following the decision of the Supreme Court in Lone 
Wolf in which to mandate the opening of the Uintah reservation 
without the consent of the Indians. 
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reservation. The Department of Interior viewed the administra-
tive task under the 1903 Act to be one of making allotments to 
the Indians and restoration of the surplus lands to the public 
domain as set forth in the 1902 Act. In May of 1903, Inspector 
McLaughlin met with the Utes in the Uinta Basin to explain to 
them that the reservation was to be terminated without their con-
sent and that allotments would be made. The following extract 
from the transcript of that meeting clearly shows McLaughlin's 
understanding that the reservation boundaries were to be extin-
guished (JX 162, pg. 42): 
Inspector McLaughlin: 
A number of your speakers have said that you do 
not want your land stolen from you. My friends, 
these hills, these streams, these valleys will all 
remain just as they are. There will be no change 
in the nature of the country but the improvements 
that will come when white people come in among you. 
My friends, Red Cap said my talk was cloudy, and 
you do not understand it. You are the people who 
are in the dark in regard to the force of this act 
of congress, and I am trying to bring you into the 
light. You say that line is very heavy and that 
the reservation is nailed down upon the border. 
That is very true as applying to the past many"" 
years and up to now, but congress has provided 
legislation which will pull up the nails which hold 
down that line and after next year there will be no 
outside boundary line to this reservation^ (Em-
phasis added).±k/ 
d. The Act of March 3, 1905 
The time set by the 1904 Act for opening the 
reservation (March 10, 1905) was running out. Early in 1905, the 
25. For a more detailed version of McLaughlin1s negotiations 
with the Indians, see JX 162, pp. 42-45. A subsequent report of 
McLaughlin, summarizing his meetings with the Utes, can be found 
at LD 101, pp. 9-12. 
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Department of Interior had not been able to complete surveys of 
reservation land in order to make the allotments, so that the 
excess lands could in turn be ascertained and restored to the 
public domain. This delay prompted the Senate, on February 4, 
1905, to demand an explanation from the Secretary of the Interior 
as to why he apparently was not going to meet the March 10 dead-
line (see LD 101 at p. 1). The Secretary reported promptly, 
under date of February 15, 1905, setting forth the progress that 
had been made, and explaining, inter alia, that the Department 
had experienced difficulty in completing land surveys so that 
allotments could be made and this had prevented a timely comple-
tion of the allotment program. He thus made clear the need for 
an extension of time in which to complete the allotment program. 
Accordingly, by the Act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat. 1048), 
Congress extended the effective date for terminating the reserva-
tion from March 10, 1905, to September 1, 1905. The Act provided 
in relevant part: 
That the said unallotted lands, excepting such 
tracts as may have been set aside as national 
forest reserve, and such mineral lands as were dis-
posed of by the act of Congress of May twenty-
seventh, nineteen hundred and two, shall be dis-
posed of under the general provisions of the home-
stead and town-site laws of the United States, and 
shall be opened to settlement and entry by procla-
mation of the President, which proclamation shall 
prescribe the manner in which these lands may be 
settled upon, occupied, and entered by persons en-
titled to make entry thereof; . . . 
That before the opening of the Uintah Indian Reser-
vation the President is hereby authorized to set 
apart and reserve as an addition to the Uintah 
Forest Reserve, subject to the laws, rules, and 
regulations governing forest reserves, and subject 
to the mineral rights granted by the act of Con-
gress of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and 
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two, such portions of the lands within the Uintah 
Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and 
he may also set apart and reserve any reservoir 
site or other lands necessary to conserve and pro-
tect the water supply for the Indians or for 
general agricultural development, and may confirm 
such rights to water thereon as have already ac-
crued: Provided, That the proceeds from any timber 
on such addition as may with safety be sold prior 
to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty, 
shall be paid to said Indians in accordance with 
the provisions of the act opening the reservation. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
e. The Relationship Between the 1902 and 1905 Acts 
The en banc majority thought the 1905 Act (33 
Stat. 1069), extending the time for opening, supplanted the 1902 
Act (32 Stat. 263), restoring the lands to the public domain. 
Compare Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089 with id. at 1111-12 
(Seth, J., dissenting). That reasoning is flawed and is not sup-
ported by the Acts, the legislative history or surrounding 
circumstances. 
It is true that the 1905 Act does not specifically repeat the 
"public domain" language of the 1902 Act. Rather, the 1905 Act 
contained a provision that the unallotted lands were to be dis-
posed of under "the general provisions of the homestead and town-
site laws, . . . and shall be opened to settlement and entry by 
proclamation of the President." But the 1905 Act did not purport 
to change whether there should be a disestablishment. That had 
already been clearly stated in the 1902 Act. The 1905 Act merely 
addressed the manner and procedures for accomplishing dises-
tablishment. There is no conflict or inconsistency between the 
two. 
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The provision in the 1905 Act that the surplus lands were to 
be disposed of under the homestead and townsite provisions of the 
public land laws certainly does not constitute a restriction to 
the declaration in the 1902 Act that the lands were to be re-
stored to the public domain. The intent of the 1902 Act was car-
ried over into the 1905 Act. 
The circumstances surrounding the Uintah reservation opening 
are similar in many respects to those in Rosebud, supra, where 
the Supreme Court found there to be a diminishment of reservation 
boundaries. In Rosebud, the Court held that the operative lan-
guage of the original act demonstrated "an unmistakable baseline 
purpose of disestablishmentff (430 U.S. at 592) even though the 
opening of the reservation was actually implemented by subsequent 
legislation. The same is true for the Uintah reservation legis-
lation in that each later act merely builds on the original act 
and deals primarily with extending the time for opening.2j6/ 
The legislative history of the 1905 Act, however, demon-
strates that Congress was implementing, not abandoning, the 1902 
Actfs baseline purpose to end the Uintah reservation. Compare S. 
Rep. No. 4240, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., at 14-16 (1905) (letters of 
the Commissioners of Indian Affairs and the General Land Office) 
with Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112 (Seth, J., dissenting) 
(H[n]othing in the Congressional debates suggests an attempt to 
26. On this point, the Tenth Circuit's en banc decision is 
contrary to its views as expressed in Hanson v. U.S., 153 F.2d 
162 (10th Cir. 1946), where it was concluded that the 1905 Act 
merely extended the date of opening and did not alter or affect 
the operative terms of the 1902 Act. 
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change the 1902 intent. . . " ) . See also, debates at 39 Cong. 
Rec. 1181-1185, 3522 (Jan. 21, 1905, LD 103). 
What Congress was actually concerned about in 1905 (other 
than a speedy conclusion of the allotment process) was that land 
speculators might deprive bona-fide homesteaders of the land. 
See "Indian Appropriations Bill, 1906," Hearings, Subcomm. of the 
Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905, LD 
100 at 30). Nowhere in the cited subcommittee debates is there 
any statement that the purpose of the limitations on entry was to 
keep the reservation intact. To the contrary, the pertinent dis-
cussion reveals that even with such limitations the land would 
still be restored to the public domain. Senator Teller, one of 
the advocates of the limitation on entry stated at the hearings: 
HI am not going to consent to any speculators getting public land 
if I can help it" (Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra, LD 100 at 
30) (emphasis added). Further, there is nothing in the congres-
sional debates or reports to indicate that Congress ever intended 
or desired to preserve the original exterior boundary of the Uin-
tah reservation. 
The real purpose and intent of the 1905 Act was not only to 
implement the restoration of the surplus lands to the public do-
main as provided in the 1902 Act, but also to allow entry and 
settlement of such lands only under the homestead and townsite 
laws in order to prevent speculation. Limitations on entry such 
as those contained in the 1905 Act are not inconsistent with the 
previously expressed intent of Congress to restore surplus lands 
to the public domain and disestablish the reservation. Again, 
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the cumulative series of acts in this case can be compared to 
those in Rosebud where the Supreme Court held there to be a 
disestablishment. Rosebud at 592. 
That the 1905 Act carried the 1902 Act into effect is further 
clearly demonstrated by the Presidential Proclamation opening the 
original Uintah reservation for entry and settlement. The Presi-
dential Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119), employing 
much the same format as that used in the 1904 Rosebud Proclama-
tion, provided: 
Whereas it was provided by the Act of Congress, 
approved May 27, . . . 1902 (32 Stat., 263), among 
other things, that on October first, 1903, the un-
allotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, in 
the State of Utah, "shall be restored to the public 
domain: . . . .M 
And, whereas, the time for the opening of said 
unallotted lands was extended to October 1, 1904, 
by the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1903 (32 
Stat., 998), and was extended to March 10, 1905, by 
the Act of Congress approved April 21, 1904 (33 
Stat., 207), and was again extended to not later 
than September 1, 1905, by the Act of Congress, 
approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1069), which last 
named act provided, among other things: 
[The Act is here quoted] 
Now, therefore, I . . . do hereby declare . . . 
that all the unallotted lands in said reservation, 
excepting such as have at that time been reserved 
. . ., and such mineral lands as may have been 
disposed of . . ., will on and after the 28th day 
of August, 1905, in the manner hereinafter pre-
scribed, and not otherwise, be opened to entry, 
settlement, and disposition under the general pro-
visions of the homestead and townsite laws of the 
United States. . . . 
34 Stat, at 3119-20 (emphasis added). 
The President thus clearly understood that the 1905 Act was 
implementing—not deviating from—the purpose of disestablishment 
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underlying the 1902 Act. The 1905 Proclamation is similar to the 
one involved in Rosebud and constitutes an "unambiguous, contem-
poraneous, statement, by the Nation1s Chief Executive of a per-
ceived disestablishment. . ." (id., 430 U.S. at 602-03), and 
unmistakably reflects the intent of Congress. See id. at 603. 
On this subject the en banc majority opinion is again silent. 
3. Additional Considerations Support Disestablishment 
In addition to examining the legislation opening a 
reservation, the Supreme Court has stated that another component 
of its Hfairly clean analytical structure" is to examine the 
subsequent history of the area: 
On a more pragmatic level, we have recognized 
that who actually moved onto opened reservation 
lands is also relevant to deciding whether a 
surplus land act diminished a reservation. Where 
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion 
of a reservation and the area has long since lost 
its Indian character, we have acknowledged that de 
facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have oc-
curred. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, 
at 588, n 3, and 604-605, 51 L Ed 2d 660, 97 S Ct 
1361; Decoteau v. District County Court, 429 US at 
428, 43 L Ed 2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082. In addition to 
the obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to 
de facto diminishment, we look to the subsequent 
demographic history of opened lands as one addi-
tional clue as to what Congress expected would hap-
pen once land on a particular reservation was 
opened to non-Indian settlers. 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. 
The Court further noted that: 
When an area is predominately populated by non-
Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian 
allotments, finding that the land remains Indian 
Country seriously burdens the administration of 
State and local governments. 
Solem at 471, n.12. 
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In Rosebud, the Court stated: 
The fact that neither Congress nor the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs has sought to exercise its 
authority over this area, or to challenge the 
State's exercise of authority, is a factor entitled 
to weight as a part of the "jurisdictional his-
tory.1* The long-standing assumption of jurisdic-
tion by the State over an area that is over 90% 
non-Indian, both in population and in land use, not 
only demonstrates the parties1 understanding of the 
meaning of the Act, but has created justifiable 
expectations which should not be upset by so 
strained a reading of the Acts. . . 
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 604-05. We will now briefly examine several 
additional factors which strongly support disestablishment. 
a. Subsequent Administrative and Congressional 
Recognition of Termination 
The 1905 Presidential Proclamation, discussed 
supra, which opened the reservation, does not stand alone in its 
reference that the surplus lands were restored to the public do-
main. The understanding of other responsible government offi-
cials has, until recent years, consistently mirrored President 
Roosevelt's construction.7JJ Many of the documents cited in the 
27. See, e.g., Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to the Secretary of Interior, dated May 11, 1905, at 3 
(JX 463) ; Letter of the Acting Secretary of Interior, dated Sep-
tember 3, 1909; Letter of the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office to Senator Reed Smoot, dated December 20, 1909; Letter of 
the Secretary of Interior to Senator Reed Smoot, dated January 
12, 1911; H.R. Doc. No. 892, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-2 (1912) 
(Joint Report of Inspector James McLaughlin and the Chief Super-
visor) ; H.R. Doc. No. 1250, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., at 1-2 (1914) 
(Letter of the Secretary); Letter of the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated 
September 28, 1922, at 1 (JX 403); Letter of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, dated December 1, 1927, at 2; 54 I.D. 559, 561-62 
(1934) (JX 431); Solicitor Opinion M-33626, at 2 (August 3, 
1944); Secretarial Order, 10 Fed. Reg. 12409 (1945) (LD 183); 59 
I.D. 393 (1947); Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 1-2, 5 (December 
7, 1950); Appeal of Edward M. Brown, A-26523, at 1-2 (December 
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margin expressly recognize that, with respect to the original 
Uintah reservation, the unallotted and unreserved lands were re-
stored to the public domain under the provisions of the 1902 Act. 
The record shows as well that officials of the Interior Depart-
ment treated the original Uintah reservation as having been 
disestablished. Thus, with the opening of the reservation in 
1905, Department officials immediately began referring to the 
original area as the Mformer" reservation. For decades after the 
opening, Interior officials consistently administered only the 
trust lands (the tribal grazing reserve, the allotments, and the 
lands later restored to tribal ownership and reservation status) 
as the Tribefs existing reservation,2JL/ a practice that continued 
until recently.29/ 
27. (Contfd.) 11, 1952); Appeal of Charles B. Gonsales, at 1 
(January 23, 1953); and Secretarial Order, 36 Fed. Reg. 19920 
(1971) (LD 210). 
28. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 5010, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 
1-2 (1906) (Letters of Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs); Presidential Proclamation dated September 1, 
1906, 34 Stat. 3228; Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, dated September 26, 1907, at 1 (JX 336); Letter of the 
First Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, dated November 8, 1907, at 1 (JX 338); H.R. Doc. 
No. 1279, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-3 (1909) (1908 Letters of 
Secretary and Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Letter of the 
Secretary of Interior, dated December 19, 1908, at 1, 2, 4 & 6 
(JX 341); and 39 I.D. 79 (1910) (Acting Secretary of Interior). 
See also 34 I.D. 549, 549-50 (1906) (Assft. Attorney General). 
29. See, e.g., 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth J., dissenting); S. 
Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the 
Secretary of the Interior); 1929 Annual Report of the Uintah & 
Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 420); 1931 Agency Grazing Report, at 1, 3 
(JX 424); 1931 Annual Agency Report, at 4 (JX 425); 1932 Annual 
Agency Report, at 1 (JX 427); H.R. Rep. No. 370, 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess., at 3 (1941) (Report submitted by Secretary of Interior); 
Phoenix Area Office, Information Profiles of Indian Reservations 
in Arizona, Nevada & Utah, at 155 (1976) (JX 480). 
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Subsequent legislation and other congressional materials are 
to the same effect.22/ Numerous congressional documents subse-
quent to the 1905 opening contain references to the "former" 
reservation. See for example, Senate Report No. 219, 61st Cong. 
2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1910 (LD 138) entitled "Making Available Lands 
On Former Uintah Indian Reservation," (emphasis added).21/ 
It should be noted that these numerous and repeated referen-
ces in congressional documents were consistent with the policy of 
the day of disestablishing Indian reservations and assimilating 
the Indians into society. 
30. See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1912, 37 Stat. 196; S. Rep. 
No. 139, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); H.R. Rep. No. 291, 
59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); S. Rep. No. 893, 62d Cong., 
2d Sess., at 1-2 (1912); H.R. Rep. No. 943, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 
at 1-2 (1912); S. Rep. No. 979, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1-2 
(1926); H.R. Rep. No. 2047, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1927); 
and 74 Cong. Rec. 3408 (1931). Characteristic of Congress* 
treatment is the Act of July 20, 1912, which provided that: 
any person who has heretofore made a homestead entry for 
land which was formerly a part of the Uintah Indian 
Reservation in the State of Utah, authorized by the Act 
approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, 
and Acts amendatory thereto. . . . 
37 Stat. 196 (emphasis added). See also Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 
603, n.25. 
31. For other past tense references to the "former" reserva-
tion, see: Congressional Floor Debates, Jan. 15, 1906, p. 1064 
(LD 116); Senate Bill 321, Jan. 27, 1906 (LD 120); H.R. Rep. No. 
823, Feb. 9, 1906 (LD 122); S. Rep. No. 2561—Indian Appropria-
tions Bill, p. 131, April 13, 1906 (LD 124); S. Rep. No. 4263, 
June 12, 1906 (LD 126); Public Law 258 (H.R. 15331, pp. 375-76) 
June 21, 1906 (LD 127); H.R. Rep. No. 5010, June 25, 1906 (LD 
128); Senate Bill 6375 (P.L. 345) June 29, 1906 (LD 129); P.L. 
104—Indian Appropriations Bill, p. 95, April 30, 1908 (LD 135); 
P.L. 144—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 285, April 4, 1910 (LD 
139); P.L. 434—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 1074, March 31, 
1911 (LD 141); P.L. 717, 70 Stat. 546, 548, July 14, 1956 (LD 
203) . 
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Judicial pronouncements also follow suit. In decisions ren-
dered prior to Ute Indian Tribe, the courts interpreted the 1905 
Act as merely amending, not superseding, the 1902 Act.l^/ In-
deed, in 1946, the Tenth Circuit expressly held in Hanson v. 
United States—a decision unaccountably ignored by the en banc 
majority—that the unalloted and unreserved lands of the original 
Uintah reservation were "restored to the public domain by the Act 
of May 27, 1902. . . ." Id. at 163. The Utah Supreme Court 
likewise recognized the restoration of the unallotted lands to 
the public domain under these Acts. Sowards, 108 P. at 1114. 
Finally, in a different context, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that the Tribe*s reservation was considered to be only 
those lands held in trust by the federal government. Affiliated 
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141 (1972). 
Moreover, by holding that the original Uintah reservation 
remains intact, the en banc majority has created what must be one 
of the few—if not the only—Indian reservations engulfing a na-
tional forest. The district court and the panel of the court of 
appeals agreed that such an anomaly was not intended and that the 
forest provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1048, 
1069-70, which set aside more than 1 million acres "as an addi-
tion to the Uintah Forest reserve, subject to the laws, rules and 
regulations governing forest reserves," thereby diminished the 
32. See Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d at 162-63; Uintah 
and White River Bands of Ute Indians, 139 Ct.Cl. at 5-6 & 21-22; 
United States v. Boss, 160 F. 132, 132-33 (D. Utah 1906); and 
Sowards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1114 (Utah 1910). 
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original Uintah reservation. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1313-
14. The en banc majority thought, incorrectly, that under Solem 
the transfer of the administration of these one million acres 
from the Interior Department to the Department of Agriculture and 
the fact that Congress later compensated the Tribe for its inter-
est in the forest lands were not inconsistent with continued 
reservation status. Despite the fact, as the federal district 
court stated, that the "status and purpose of national forest 
lands are distinct from the status and purpose of Indian reserva-
tions" (Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp at 1138), the en banc 
majority apparently believed that under Solem this could be ig-
nored and that the Tribe therefore had jurisdiction within the 
national forest (Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090). There is, 
however, nothing in the Court's Solem opinion that justifies such 
an extraordinary result. Congress clearly ended the original 
Uintah reservation on the land withdrawn for a national forest, 
which further demonstrates its intent to disestablish the reser-
vation itself. 
The United States supported the Ute Tribe as amicus curiae in 
the recent federal litigation with respect to the Uintah reserva-
tion. In so doing, the United States failed to acknowledge the 
inconsistency of that position with its position in other litiga-
tion involving this reservation. In Uintah and White River Bands 
of Ute Indians v. United States, 139 Ct.Cl. 1 (1957), it entered 
into a stipulation with which the Court of Claims agreed (139 
Ct.Cl. at 5-6, 22) which quoted the 1902 Act and then succinctly 
stated the critical point: "Pursuant to this [1902] Act and 
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amendments thereto, . • . allotments in severalty . . . . were 
made to the Uintah and White River Indians, and surplus lands . . 
• . were restored to the public domain, and opened for disposi-
tion under the public land laws for the benefit of the Indians11 
(emphasis added). What is more, the United States (and the Utes) 
consistently and repeatedly maintained that the original Uintah 
reservation was a former reservation; and throughout its opinion 
and findings, the Court of Claims also treated the original Uin-
tah reservation as having ended. E.g., 139 Ct.Cl. at 2, 25, 28, 
56, 64, 69 and 70. It is also worthy of note that when the Ute 
Indian plaintiffs appeared in the Court of Claims, they summed it 
up well: "Now, the Act of May 27, 1902, comes as a matter of 
particular importance in this suit because that is the Act as 
amended under which the Uintah Reservation was ultimately broken 
up."22/ 
b. Subsequent Demographic History Supports 
Disestablishment 
Here, the demographic history of the area demon-
strates that the en banc majority's decision will not materially 
advance the interests of tribal sovereignty (which has for the 
past 60 years been exercised primarily on the trust lands), but 
will seriously hamper the functioning of State and local govern-
ments in a myriad of areas. The disputed area "lost its Indian 
character" long ago. It is "predominantly populated by non-
33. Opening statement in testimony for plaintiff, Uintah and 
White River Band of Utes v. U.S., No. 47569, U.S. Court of Claims 
at p. 195 (Jan. 11, 1954). 
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Indians," approximately 18#000 of them,21/ with only about 1,500 
tribal members, who are living mainly on trust lands. Ute Indian 
Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth, J., dissenting). The non-Indians 
are the ones "who actually moved onto the opened reservation 
lands" and have been there ever since. Thus, there has indeed 
been a de facto or de jure disestablishment. It is their "jus-
tifiable expectations," built up over a 60-year period, that 
would be upset if it were to be held that the original boundaries 
are still intact and it is their interests the en banc majority 
ignored, despite the United States Supreme Court's command that 
such factors must be taken into account. E.g., Rosebud, 430 U.S. 
at 605; and Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. 
Under the en banc majorityfs result, the Ute Tribe would pre-
side over an area owned and predominantly populated by non-
Indians and, hence, in which the Tribe has little presence and no 
real interest as a sovereign. At the same time, State and local 
authority would be significantly limited despite the fact that 
this area has principally been the concern and responsibility of 
these governments, not the Tribe. This would include increased 
tribal court jurisdiction over all residents of the area, and 
diminished state court jurisdiction. 
The testimony and exhibits introduced in the federal district 
court clearly establish that the State and its local governmental 
divisions had exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic 
34. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, General 
Population Characteristics Utah, Table 15, p. 46-12 (1980). 
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reservation area subsequent to the opening, except on the trust 
lands. The early jurisdictional history of the disputed area 
shows that the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Agency (the White 
River, Uintah and Uncompahgre Utes) were, after the historic 
reservation was opened to settlement, generally subject to the 
laws of the State of Utah within those areas so opened (excluding 
trust lands).2$/ For example, in the Annual Report of the Super-
intendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency for 1916 (JX 380), it 
was stated as follows: 
The Indians of this Jurisdiction are citizens of 
the State of Utah, and voters, and the present 
Superintendent has not assumed any jurisdiction 
over their persons. Where offences have been com-
mitted against the laws of the State, the matter 
has been reported to the County authorities and the 
agency officials have endeavored to co-operate with 
the County authorities in the maintenance of law 
and order. 
Id. at 2-3. Other documentary evidence also demonstrates that 
the State exercised jurisdiction within the historic reservation 
area beginning in the early 1900fs.2§/ 
The primary evidence regarding the more recent jurisdictional 
history of the disputed area was the testimony of various State 
and local officials introduced at the federal district court tri-
al. This testimony shows that until recently the State continued 
35. See, e.g., JX 344; JX 354 at 2-3; JX 368 at 2-3; JX 380 
at 2; JX 386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4; JX 396; JX 397 at 2; JX 399 
at 2; JX 412 at 1; JX 415 at 1-3; JX 417 at 1-2; and JX 420. 
36. See also letter from District Superintendent, Indian 
Field Service, August 5, 1926 (JX 412); Annual Report of the 
Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, 1917 and 1918; JX 
386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4. See also Trial Tr. at 269 and 277-78 
(testimony of George Marett, Sheriff of Duchesne County). 
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to exercise primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation 
area, except on the trust lands.22/ 
The evidence introduced in this case regarding the exercise 
of jurisdictional authority by the Tribe also confirms that the 
State and local governmental subdivisions have, until recently, 
exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation 
area, except on the trust lands.2§/ 
Finally, until recently the Ute Tribe itself treated only the 
trust lands as the Tribe's post-1905 reservation.21*/ As the dis-
sent in Ute Indian Tribe observed: 
Statements made by the Utes themselves also tend to de-
tract from their position. For example, the 1957 Ute 
Ten Year Development Program provides a description of 
the total acreage of the Uintah and Ouray reservation as 
currently containing 1,010,000 acres. . . . 
773 F.2d at 1114. 
37. See Trial Tr. at 106 (testimony of Clair Huff, Utah Di-
vision of Wildlife Resources); 121 (testimony of Norman Hancock, 
Division of Wildlife Resources); 158-59 (testimony of David 
Thomas, Division of Wildlife Resources); 186-87 (testimony of 
Edward Tuttle, Utah Division of Parks and Recreation); 220 (tes-
timony of Donald Smith, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources); 251 
(testimony of C. Blake Feight, Utah Division of Oil, Gas & 
Mining); 267, 270-74, 277-79 and 281-89 (testimony of George 
Marett, Duchesne County Sheriff); and 298-99 (testimony of Ray 
Wardle, member and Chief of Tribal Police, cross-deputized by 
Uintah County). 
38. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 121 and 135 (testimony of Norman 
Hancock); 159 (testimony of David Thomas); 174 (testimony of Gor-
don Harmston, Utah Department of Natural Resources); 187 (tes-
timony of Edward Tuttle); 228 (testimony of Charles East); 251 
(testimony of C. Blake Feight); 262-63 (testimony of Alfred Par-
riette, Tribe1s Division of Wildlife Management and Law Enforce-
ment) ; and 294-300 (testimony of Ray Wardle). 
39. See, e.g., 1957 Ute Ten-Year Development Program, at 66-
68 (JX 465) ; 1966 Review and Revision of the Uintah & Ouray 
Indian Reservation-Wide Program, at 7, 8; and 1969 Annual Report 
of the Uintah Indian Tribe, at 1 (JX 473). 
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Further, for many decades the Ute Tribe has maintained signs 
at the boundaries of the trust lands, advising the public that 
they were entering the "Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.M 
These signs were clearly intended to designate what the Tribe 
thought were the reservation boundaries. The signs have been 
replaced from time to time over the years (with the signs in more 
recent times being more elaborate), but they have always indi-
cated that the boundaries of the trust lands were the reservation 
boundaries.12/ 
In short, the record is clear that until recent years the 
Tribe never attempted to exert any significant jurisdictional 
authority off the trust lands. The history of the area in dis-
pute shows that it has long been the responsibility of State and 
local governments, is overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians, 
and has lost its Indian character virtually from the opening of 
the reservation in 1905. 
Applying the analytical test developed by the United States 
Supreme Court to the legislation, facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the opening of the original Uintah reservation, the con-
clusion must be that the reservation was disestablished and the 
surplus lands which were restored to the public domain are not 
part of the reservation—nor do they constitute Indian country as 
40. See, for example, the testimonies of Dave Thomas (Tr. 
155-57) and Gordon Harmston (Tr. 176-77). A series of photo-
graphs of such signs located at trust land boundaries, as such 
signs appeared on March 22, 1977, were introduced at trial as Ex. 
I-4B, coordinated with Ex. I-4A, indicating the precise locations 
where the various photographs were taken. 
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defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151• Therefore, the state district court 
had jurisdiction in this matter. 
II. PERANK'S INDIAN STATUS 
18 U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 preclude state criminal 
jurisdiction over "Indians11 who commit crimes within Indian coun-
try. Al/ However, these statutes do not provide a specific defi-
nition of who is an Indian. Perank asserts that he is an Indian, 
and contends that Article II of the Ute Tribal Constitution^?/ 
recognizes membership in the Tribe as including all children born 
to any resident member of the Tribe.il/ 
Perank submitted two affidavits below from his father and 
mother (R. 69-72), which alleged that Perank's father is a full-
blooded Indian enrolled as a member of the Ute Tribe, that his 
mother has some Indian blood, and that Perank was born in 
Roosevelt while the family was residing on the reservation. The 
record also contains a copy of Perank*s birth certificate (R. 
76), and those of other Perank family members (R. 73-75). 
As the moving party challenging the court1s jurisdiction, 
Perank carries the initial burden of producing sufficient 
evidence, beyond mere suppositions or allegations, to establish a 
41. As already shown above, the crime here was not committed 
in Indian country so Perank1s Indian status is irrelevant. 
42. It appears this Court can take judicial notice of the 
Tribal Constitution. See Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence. 
43. The Ute tribal courts have also adopted this interpreta-
tion of the tribal constitution. See Chapoose v. Ute Tribal 
Business Committee, Ute Tribal Appellate Court, Civil No. 133-77 
(1981). 
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jurisdictional question. Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 
P.2d 541, 546 (1965), and United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 
(9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, since the basis of his jurisdictional 
challenge is that he is an Indian, he carries the initial burden 
of producing prima facie evidence to establish such. United 
States v. Hester, supra. Given the evidence Perank presented, 
albeit limited, we cannot say that he failed to meet his thresh-
old burden of establishing his status as an Indian and creating a 
jurisdictional question on that issue. 
Once that threshold showing was made, the burden shifted, and 
the State was required to carry the ultimate burden of persuasion 
on jurisdiction. State v. Allen, 607 P.2d 426, 428 (Idaho 1980); 
Frankel v. Wyllie and Thornhill, Inc., 537 F.Supp. 730, 735 (N.D. 
Va. 1982). Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-501(3) provides 
that "The existence of jurisdiction . . . shall be established by 
a preponderance of the evidence." While the State argued that 
Perank was not an Indian because he was not an enrolled member of 
the Tribeii/ and had not participated in tribal activities (R. 
87-88), unfortunately, no evidence was presented below by the 
State regarding Perank1s Indian status. 
Given the state of the record, it cannot be said that Per-
ank's status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 
was not established below. 
44. Article II of the Ute Tribal Constitution does not on 
its face seem to require formal enrollment as a requisite for 
Tribal membership. We note that since his probation revocation 
Perank has evidently been enrolled as a tribal member. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of March, 1987. 
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